There are many interpretations of the scientific method. In general terms it is the way scientists investigate the world and produce knowledge about it. Many use the term to refer to an idealized, systematic approach that is supposed to characterize all scientific investigation. It is distinguished from other routes to knowledge by its use of controlled experiments and its requirement that results be reproducible. Many scholars do not believe in the existence of such a method, however, or they do not believe that it accurately describes science. The actual methods of scientists, they argue, are less ideal and more haphazard.
The question of how science operates is not only academic. In the judicial system and in policy debates, for example, a study's deviation from accepted scientific practice is grounds to reject it as "junk science." Whether they are diagnosing a patient, investigating a murder or researching a social trend, non-scientists cite "the scientific method" as a paradigm. Methodical or not, science represents a standard of proficiency and reliability.
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2 Do scientists really follow the scientific method? 3 History of the scientific method 4 See also 5 External links 6 References |
Even if scientific investigation does not always proceed or advance in the same way, there are commonalities, including steps that tend to occur in roughly the same order.
A summary of the scientific method
These steps are repeated continually, building a larger set of well-tested hypotheses to explain more and more phenomena. These steps are not necessarily always followed in the pattern shown above. For example, theoretical physicists often develop multiple new hypotheses before selecting which phenomena to observe. See the article on Philosophy of science for more on this.
Past episodes of scientific discovery have contained elements of ingenuity, opportunism and genius. Occasionally scientists have shown outright heroism. It is difficult to tell to what extent these features are necessary to the success of science and to what extent they are accidental and superfluous. The Vienna Circle answered the question by postulating two distinct processes at work during scientific research. The first a context of discovery, in which there are essentially no rules, acts only as input into the second process of justification. The context of justification is characterised by the application of logic and rigour we associate with scientific method.
Debate has raged about the practical utility of such a distinction. Further more, difficulties arise when trying to make the distinction. Whatever the outcome, the debate has provided new ammunition for both methodologists, who prefer to retain the distinction so that their methods have some quarry, and for philosophers of a more historical bent who feel that the success of science is not tied to simple rules.
Most philosophers of science are agreed that there are no definitive guidelines for the production of new hypotheses. The history of science is filled with stories of scientists describing a "flash of inspiration", or a hunch, which then motivated them to look for evidence to support or refute their idea. The anecdote that an apple falling on Isaac Newton's head inspired his theory of gravity is a popular example of this (there is no evidence that the apple fell on his head; all Newton said was that his ideas were inspired "by the fall of an apple.") Kekule's account of the inspiration for his hypothesis of the structure of the benzene-ring (dreaming of snakes biting their own tails) is better attested.
Scientists tend to look for theories that are "elegant" or "beautiful"; in contrast to the usual English use of these terms, scientists have a more specific meaning in mind. "Elegance" (or "beauty") refers to the ability of a theory to neatly explain all known facts as simply as possible, or in a manner consistent with Occam's Razor.
In 1962 Thomas Kuhn published his essay The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, a seminal work on the practice and process of science. Kuhn suggested that sociological mechanisms significantly affect the rejection of older scientific theories and the acceptance of new ones. According to Kuhn, when a scientist encounters an anomaly that is not explained by the scientific community's currently accepted general paradigm or theory, that community can ignore it (the increasing problems with Ptolemaic epicycles in accounting for the motion of the planets was a long standing case), but is often compelled to accommodate it by either modifying the existing theory or replacing it with a new one. A paradigm shift occurs when a new paradigm gains wider acceptance than a pre-existing one. It is at this point that sociological factors may partly influence that abandonment. Kuhn postulates that "normal science" continues on after the adoption of a new paradigm, punctuated with occasional scientific revolutions as later anomalies arise and paradigm shifts occur.
The typical example used in Kuhnian explanations is the development of astronomical theory that began, more or less, with the Aristotelian model of the universe: "The earth is the center of a pristine, perfect universe," and all motions in such a universe must be circular. The Aristotelian model was afflicted with various anomalies, such as the apparent retrograde motion of the planets, which were accommodated by modifications of the model. Nicolaus Copernicus's model differed by placing the sun at the center of planetary motion. Both Kepler and Galileo found evidence that supported the heliocentric model. Aristotle's laws were replaced by Isaac Newton, and eventually by Albert Einstein's General Relativity. This example demonstrates that much time may pass before a substitute paradigm is widely accepted. The Aristotelian model dominated Western thought for more than 2000 years before Newton's viewpoint took its place.
Late 20th century study on the scientific method has focused on quasi-empirical methods, such as peer review, the spread of notations, which are the key common concern of philosophy of science, and the philosophy of mathematics.
History is replete with examples of accurate theories ignored by peers, and inaccurate ones propagated unduly, due to social factors. The establishment of "official" scientific doctrine in the former Soviet Union is a case in point.
Scientists differ on how 'real' their models of reality are - the traditional concern of philosophy of science itself. Some writers involved with deconstructionism adopt a position of extreme skepticism, and argue that no empirical methods can validate any given theory, and therefore all of science must be seen as quasi-empirical. They argue that science is just a social construction; it is only a way that human cultures come to agree on facts, notations, and predictions.
The earliest foundations of the scientific method are often credited to Roger Bacon in England and Galileo Galilei in Italy. Later contributions by Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes and others have added to the understanding of scientific method. Some historians of science believe that their developing the collection of practises which comprise the scientific method may have been inspired by preceding tradition, either developed in the Islamic world, or at least conserved by it.
Do scientists really follow the scientific method?
History of the scientific method
See also
External links
References
