History records two operations called Chariot; the 1942 raid on the French port of St Nazaire and a nuclear blast proposed for a remote part of Alaska.
The first Operation Chariot was a British attack on the docks of St Nazaire in occupied France on the night of March 28, 1942 during World War II. The operation was undertaken by Royal Navy and Commando units under the auspices of Louis Mountbatten's Combined Operations.

Table of contents
1 St Nazaire
2 The British Plan
3 The Journey
4 The Attack
5 Back Out to Sea
6 The Battle at the Docks
7 Later

St Nazaire

The value of attacking St Nazaire rested in a number of features. The main target was the Forme Ecluse Louis Joubert, an enormous lock and dry dock capable of holding the largest Kreigsmarine warships and the only dock of that size on the Atlantic coast. The British feared that the Tirpitz would be transferred to St Nazaire. The dock had been built from 1924-28 to accommodate the Normandie liner and is sometimes referred to as the Normandie Dock. It was 1148 feet long and 164 wide, connecting at one end into the Peahouet basin and entering the estuary at the other. The locks of the dock were caisson-and-camber style, each 167 feet long and 35 feet thick constructed of hollow steel sections.

As well as the dock the harbour included a new submarine basin built by the Organisation Todt with six enormous pens. It connected to the sea via two entrances both fitted with lock systems, one opening east near the Normandie Dock and one opening south into the new (1907) avant-port.

The German defences at St Nazaire were considered the second toughest in western France after Brest. Both sides of the estuary approach were fortified and were manned by the 280 Naval Artillery Battalion (commanded by Edo Dieckmann) and the 22 Naval Flak Battalion (commanded by C. C. Mecke). Fortified guns on the northern shore included four 150 mm howitzers, four 170 mm guns and four 75 mm guns at Chémoulin, south-west of St Nazaire; four 88 mm guns and ten 20 mm or 40 mm guns at Villès Martin closer to St Nazaire; Further away at La Baule were four 105 mm guns and two railway 240 mm guns. Across the estuary from St Nazaire were four 75 mm guns at St Gilda, another four at Le Pointeau and ten or so 20 mm guns at Mindin. In the immediate harbour area were around 30 single 20 mm guns, two quad 20 mm guns, around 15 40 mm guns and a flakship, the Sperrbrecher 137, just off the new port. Heavy anti-aircraft defences were also situated within the town. Radar stations were operating at Le Croisic and at St Marc, all the German positions also had searchlights. Around 1,000 troops manned these defences and there were a further 5,000 or so military personnel in the town. Excluding submarines the naval power in the town was limited to ten minesweepers, four small hafenschutzboote and four torpedo-boats.

The British Plan

The Combined Operations scheme relied very heavily on surprise. A flotilla of shallow-draft boats would speed up the estuary while the German defences were distracted by an air-raid. An explosive ship would be rammed into the exposed caisson of the Normandie Dock and Commando raiding parties would disembark from that ship and others to attack and destroy 24 different targets, the force would then be withdrawn by sea from the edge of the harbour, the 'Old Mole', and some hours later the explosive ship would detonate. The initial force was planned at one destroyer as the explosive ship and eight motor launches. The final force was the destroyer, sixteen launches, one motor gunboat and one torpedo-boat.

The destroyer was HMS Campbeltown, an obsolete craft. She was previously the Buchanan of the US Navy, transferred to britain early in the war as part of a fifty vessel deal. The Campbeltown was roughly refigured to resemble a Möwe class destroyer, but all the main guns and excess weight was removed to reduce her draught to the minimum possible, her armament was a single 12-pounder and eight 20 mm Oerlikons. The explosive was placed just behind the forward main gun position, it consisted of 24 Mark VII depth-charges enclosed in steel tanks and concrete. The ship was to ram the caisson and then be scuttled to prevent her removal before she could explode. The Campbeltown was commanded by Lieutenant-commander S. H. Beattie and the crew was reduced to just 75.

The motor launches was B-class Fairmile craft, 112 feet long and 19.5 feet in beam they were powered by two 650 hp petrol engines. Built of mahogany they had very little armour and were extremely vulnerable to fire and to damage to the tricky hydraulic steering system. They were armed with 20 mm Oerlikon for air defence, four WW I vintage Lewis guns and depth charges. With a normal crew of twelve on Operation Chariot each carried an additional fifteen commandos and extra fuel tanks.

The motor gunboat, MGB 314, was added to act as a headquarters ship for the naval command. Also a Fairmile craft she was a C-class, very slightly smaller but powered by three 850 hp engines each driving a screw and capable of almost 30 knots. She was armed with one automatic 2-pounder forwards, one semi-automatic 2-pounder amidships and two .50-cal machineguns. She was also fitted with an indifferent radar system and a useful echo-sounder.

The torpedo-boat, MTB 74, was a special craft, a Vosper motor-boat she was modified to carry special 2200-lb delay charges in her torpedo tubes, other than that she had five Hotchkiss machineguns. With five engines generating over 3,500 hp she was capable of almost 45 knots but consumed so much fuel that she would have to be towed most of the way to the target. She and all the other motor boats were painted a special shade of purple, dubbed 'Plymouth Pink', designed to make them less conspicuous to searchlights.

The entire group was escorted most of the way to the target by two Hunt-class destroyers, HMS Atherstone and HMS Tynedale.

The total number of men employed in the attack was 611. The naval commander was R. E. D. Ryder and the Commandos were led by Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Newman. The Commando force was divided into three groups and split, with two groups on the motor launches and one on the Campbeltown. The Commando groups were further sub-divided into demolition squads and protection squads. The demolition squads carried 60-90 lb of demolition equipment each, mainly explosives and cordex but also 'tar babies', sledgehammers and axes. With the demolition men carrying so much kit they were only armed with pistols, the protection squads with Thompson SMGs, grenades and Brens were to defend them while they worked.

The initial bomber support was 35 Whitleys and 25 Wellingtons, this force was greatly reduced before the operation due to the needs of Bomber Command. Its effectiveness was furthered reduced by the order of Churchill to absolutely minimise French casualties.

The Journey

The ships left Falmouth on March 26, aiming to be ramming the Campbeltown into the caisson at 01.30 on the 28th. Initially the flotilla sailed south-west and then south, adopting the arrow-head formation of an anti-submarine sweep. Apart from a brief clash with a U-boat on the 27th the ships proceeded unseen, turning eastwards on the morning of the 27th and finally north-east in the early evening. One motor launch suffer a mechanical failure and returned to England alone. As they approached St Naizaire the ships moved into a simple formation, two lines of motor launches with the Campbeltown in-between and the MGB leading the way. Rather than taking the main channel the ships cut across the shallows to the west, the Campbeltown narrowly avoiding grounding.

The Attack

The diversionary bombing was desultory and did little except to alert the German forces that something odd was happening. Despite this the British ships got very close to the harbour without being fired upon. The force was first noticed at 01.15 but the first searchlights did not go on until 01.22 when the force was little more than 1.5 nautical miles from the harbour. The British used a German morse call sign and gained almost five more minutes, it was not until 01.28 with less than a mile to the harbour that the German guns opened fire. The Campbeltown drew the most fire but despite taking a number of casualties struck the southern caisson at around 20 knots at 01.34, jamming herself deep into the structure and crumpling almost 40 feet of her hull. The delay action fuses had been set shortly before the ship came under fire. The seven Commando teams then disembarked and made for their targets, successfully destroying much of the equipment associated with the Normandie Dock and also damaging the northern caisson. As these Commando groups withdrew and headed for the pier to embark they finally became aware of how the remainder of the force was fairing.

The seventeen smaller vessels, although receiving less fire, were much more vulnerable. In the four minutes around the ramming by the Campbeltown eight of the launches were destroyed in the channel. A few hits were often sufficient to set the motor launches ablaze and when the crew and Commandos had to abandon themselves to the water or Carley rafts many drowned or, more horribly, were caught in the burning fuel that spread across the water. Most of the eight craft destroyed suffered greater than 80% fatalities, even on the surviving craft barely a single man escaped injury. In the dark and dazzled by the searchlights several boats overshot the harbour entrance and had to turn back through heavy fire to try and land their Commandos. MTB 74 survived, fired her special torpedoes into the lock at the Old entrance and made it back out to sea after taking on around half the crew of the Campbeltown. Only a few Commando teams on the launches made it ashore, none successfully at the 'Old Mole' where they were hoping to re-embark and escape. The intact motor launches took on what survivors they could find or rescue from the water, made smoke and retreated, leaving just over a hundred Commandos on the docks. MGB 314 survived and was the last vessel to leave, her decks covered in wounded men rescued from the waters, the two Able Seamen Savage and Smith distinguishing themselves until their deaths as they manned the exposed automatic 2-pounder.

Back Out to Sea

The boats that made it back out to sea were heading for a point around 25 nautical miles out from St Nazaire, where they would rendezvous with their destroyer escorts. As the boats moved out into the wider part of the channel they came under fire from heavier guns, although at longer range. Two boats were destroyed in the race down river, one of the motor launches and MTB 74. Both vessels were carrying many wounded and most of the Campbeltown crew and their losses accounted for over half of the entire naval casualties. A final motor launch, carrying 28, was engaged at around 05.30 by a small German destroyer, the Jaguar commanded by F. K. Paul. Eager to capture the British vessel the Jaguar did not use her main armament and the two vessels exchanged heavy small arms fire, eventually after almost a hour of firing and manoeuvring, with twenty dead or seriously wounded the British surrendered. Sergeant T. F. Durrant, who had manned a Lewis gun during the clash, was later posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross.

Four British vessels made the rendezvous with the destroyers, two were abandoned at that point due to their condition and the others slightly later as the destroyers came under air-attack. Three motor launches which missed the destroyers made it back to Falmouth under their own power.

The Battle at the Docks

The Commandos left behind were soon heavily pressed, Stosstruppen from Works and Flak companies began to enter the dock area from around 02.00. Also, with the withdrawal of the boats, the German 20 and 40 mm guns began to fire into the dock area. The British regrouped amongst the warehouses and, decling to surrender, at around 03.00 took off on a circuitous route to cross a bridge into the main town and then, hopefully, into the open country.

Leaving a steady trail of dead and wounded the Commandos worked through the docks and charged the bridge, breaking through onto the Place de la Vielle Ville, but with barely one in four of the force uninjured. The Commando breakout coincided with the arrival of regular soldiers and armooured vehicles from the 679 MI Brigade. The British were forced southwards into the town and under increasing fire sought cover. The German's surrounded the town, posted road-blocks, stopped all traffic and conducted a house-to-house search, almost the British were captured or killed by around 10.00. They were assembled at La Baule, numbering roughly 200, and taken away to various POW camps, most to Stalag 133. Five British soldiers avoided capture and made it all the way to Gibraltar. Of the British force 169 had been killed, German casualties from the battle were 42 killed and 127 wounded.

As well as the VC for Durrant a further four VCs were awarded - to Beattie, Newman, Ryder and Savage.

Later

The Campbeltown charges were timed to go off at around 09.00 at the very latest. A German search had not uncovered the explosive and the appointed time passed and it was not until 10.35 that the Campbeltown exploded, destroying the caisson and killing about 250 German soldiers and civilans in the vicinity. The reason for this delay in detonation has never, and will never be, resolved.

The explosive charges dropped by MTB 74 at the lock gates did not detonate until the 30th, as expected. This late explosion shook the German garrison and led to a night of panic with German forces firing on French civilians and each other. Sixteen French civilans were killed and around thirty wounded. Later 1,500 civilians were arrested and taken to the camp at Savenay.


A less well-known Operation Chariot, was a 1958 American proposal to construct an artificial harbor at Cape Thompson, Alaska by means of a nuclear explosion. Some serious planning of this scheme was conducted until it was cancelled in 1962 by the Kennedy Administration.

In addition to the objections of the local population, no real use of such a harbor was ever identified. The political implications of detonating a nuclear explosion in Alaska, even though it was some distance from the Bering Straits and the Soviet Union, may also have been a consideration.

See Operation Plowshare.