In 1789, as Europe was seething on the eve of the French Revolution, the morbid giant lying to its east, the Ottoman Empire, was in no mood to contemplate on “the rights of Man” or the “equality among classes”. As a long war with Russia was burning up to its doorsteps, its ruling military and bureaucratic elite were ever more nostalgic of the glorious past of the Empire.
Since the heydays of the Ottoman Empire in the 1500’s, Europe had seen rapid technological and economic development, while the Muslim Ottoman elites, out of their disdain for all things “infidel”, were largely oblivious of European advances during the Renaissance and Reformation periods . In contrast, the Ottoman Empire had experienced decline in trade, administrative efficiency and manpower. The once mighty pillars of the military state, the Janissary infantry and the Sipahi cavalry also became outmoded in comparison to the vastly improved war machines of Europe and Russia, a bitter rival of the Ottomans in territorial domination.
There had been several Ottoman reforms since the 17th century, invariably calling for a return to the “glorious past” of Suleyman and Selim the Great, and on the other hand reinforcing traditional bounds in the military and bureaucratic corps of the ruling class (Askeriye). However, the technological and economic woes that caused Ottoman military and administrative inefficiency in the 18th century cannot be tackled by the 16th century mode of affairs. The roots of corruptions were too entrenched to even be detected by the center and too ubiquitous to be confronted. Though worthless in campaigns against European armies, the Janissaries were still strong enough to hector the bureaucrats from adopting any reform that would threaten their interests. Once the terror of Europe, these troops were now but parasites that sapped the strength of their own empire.
The reigns of Selim III and Mahmud II saw a new trend in Ottoman reforms. Instead of frowning upon European institutions, these rulers introduced a series of measures introducing them into their domain, in Mahmud’s case by ruthless suppression of old institutions defying the sultan, thus inaugurating the practice of Ottoman Westernization. Their reforms had no doubt cut open windows on the “iron curtain” of the isolationist Islamic traditional society. Under the impact of Western influences, the traditional social fabric of the Islamic society would be challenged and sometimes distorted beyond recovery. New ideologies, new modes of statecraft and worldviews would marginalize the old ones and galvanize all who were disenfranchised or were alienated by the changes.
The reforms of Selim and Mahmud also fired the signal shot that sent the Islamic World on the inevitable racetrack of modernization, and in doing so, prolonged the life of a moribund empire. However, it is questionable whether these two despots’ foresights were so far-reaching that they were intentionally embarking the empire on a path toward growth and prosperity. Their reforms were excessively on the field of military Westernization while economic development and the welfare of the common people were almost completely neglected. An English sailor, Adolphus Slade, upon his visit to the Ottoman Empire, commented on Mahmud II: “In scanning over the riches of civilization, spread out before him for acceptance, he contemptuously rejects those calculate to benefit his people, and chooses the modern scientific governing machine, result of ages of experiments, with its patent screws for extracting blood and treasure, conscription and taxation .”
A careful examination of the socio-political climate of the time will help understanding whether these Ottoman rulers were merely continuing the patterns of the reactionary reformers of old, striving to strengthen control of the central government under the name of the sultan, thus returning the empire to its militaristic golden age, or whether they were far-reaching visionaries that brought unprecedented change to a land of obstinate conservatism.
The Ottoman Empire was germinated from the “gazi” or marching lord dynasty of Osman. Before acquiring its full extent of territories, the Islamic state was in constant warfare against its neighbors, notably Byzantium and the eastern principalities of Europe. The entire state, united by the single figure of the gazi, later sultan-caliph, consisted of the military class called the “askeriye”, which not only included the feudal and slave troops ready for combat duties, but also its bureaucratic, judiciary and religious dignitaries. The militaristic nature of the ruling elite entailed that it emphasized constant vigilance against foreign and heretic, rebellious enemies. This was so that the maintenance of the state was recognized as the source of prosperity and order among the subjects (reaya).
A 15th century historian laid down this Ottoman rule of thumb: “Harmony among men living in society is achieved by statecraft .” This led to the fundamental social divide between the “reaya” and the “askeriye”, which through cultivating an elite culture called “adab” had separate itself from the common subjects. Elitism was a necessary component of Ottoman political legitimacy.
This concentration of political focus on the ideals of a single ruling class is essential to understanding the nature of Ottoman reforms . Since acquisition of power in the political center was understood by most Ottomans as the single best path of ascendance, askeri career naturally became the blood-stained arena of Ottoman political history. While the entire Ottoman was in ascendance in acquisition of territories and wealth, the askeri ambitions for power were kept in a balance so that the edge of the war machine would be sharpened, meek elements cast out and hostilities directed toward foreign territories to be gained.
However, by the 18th century Ottoman territories in Europe were shrinking and war had become a loss-making industry , all the while internecine struggles for power among different askeri factions was as strong as ever. Janissaries, bureaucrats and provincial notables turned against the very source of power they depended and sapped it with limitless selfish greed, since the Ottoman system of restraint or checks of power, called “hadd”, was merely an honor-system unprepared for these zealots of greed. Members of the askeri class were forced to plunder with whatever transient state power they were invested with, for they knew full well that they were “oppressors of their kin when they wore the mantle of the state, and the oppressed when they lost it ”.
The state, wary of the Machiavellian nature of the struggles among its members, was reluctant to give legal recognition of their political gains, and was instead prone to confiscate, or encourage someone to seize them whenever their holders were weak, often on the flimsiest pretexts. This unique strategy for the state, embodied by the sultan and his bureaucrats, to maintain its prestige by encouraging rivalries among subordinates worked consistently well throughout Ottoman history but fundamentally deprived the state of the sound moral fabric necessary for a successful, sincere reform. The jungle law of Ottoman political structures determined the political climate immediately before Selim III’s accession in 1789: the atavistic Janissary troops, kept enormous specifically for the sake of power-grabbing in the central government, had become a black hole that drained the state treasury. It had time after time attempted to staff all branches of the ruling institutions with its members , their partial success was only checked by the equally enormous and venal scribal corps . Successive coups and the practice of raising the heir-apparent in the harem “cage” (kafes) largely rendered the sultan an ineffectual figure at the disposal of whichever dominant political faction of the day.
Economic decline added to the woes of the empire. European overseas expansion, large influx of New World precious metal, loss of Danubian bread-basket principalities to the Austrians and Russians, the rise of provincial tax revenues to local notables (ayan, derebeys) deprived the pre-capitalist state reliable source of income .
In 1789, the new sultan, Selim III would have little comprehension of the extent of the symptoms brought by these combined challenges to the Ottoman state. What was most apparent was the military inferiority of the imperial army against Austrian and Russian armies in the war that would result in the humiliating Peace of Jassy in 1792. One year after the treaty, Selim started implementing his reforms, mainly focusing on reinforcing order and efficiency in the army.
He attempted to separate the strictly military duties of commanders from the administrative and financial ones by appointing supervisors (nazirs) to the existing corps, including the Janissary. Then he tried to reduced the number of the soldiers by writing off the largely useless body of dependents, most of whom women, children and guild artisans tied to Janissary business interests. These measures were vehemently opposed by the Janissaries and only had success among the artillery and mortar corps and the navy, which were almost administrative fictions upon his accession.
A bolder attempt by Selim was the creation of an entirely new corps independent of the old structure and was organized along European lines. This corps, so called “New Order” (Nizami Cedid), after the new treasury and taxation system introduced exclusively for this purpose, was established in 1793 . Along with this new army came new schools staffed by European experts and European equipments and uniforms, an unprecedented innovation in Ottoman history that would enrage the Janissaries .
Another nuisance to the Janissaries was that this new corps was levied among the Anatolian peasants, challenging the elite exclusivity of the old army. In order to finance the new corps, the sultan employed swift measures to seize fiefs (timars) allotted to the long defunct cavalry (sipahi) troops and handed them to tax-farmers. This is a step that would transform the land and property laws of Ottoman society.
Selim’s administrative reforms were largely along traditional lines: reducing redundant apprentices and scribes that were products of nepotism and favoritism and reinforcing traditional scribal standards, while the de facto viziral domination of the government was officially recognized . These were merely scratching the surface, as nepotism still ran rampant in the bureaucratic institutions. In the provinces, Selim gave greater power to the notables in order to enlist their support and assistance in areas where little central control existed.
Selim was an ineffectual monarch who continued the traditional Ottoman strategy of maintaining prestige by pitting one faction against another, this he did to factions of reformers and reactionaries alike . The reformers also had their own political interests and fought among themselves for the most trivial gains. As the reforms made more and more enemies in the army and the Ulema alike, due to Selim’s pro-French tendencies, the reactionaries rallied against the reformers. In order to appease the reactionaries, Selim unwisely gave in to their demands till the last minute, when in May 1807, he had Nizami Cedid soldiers ordered to stay in their barracks as mutinous Janissaries marched on the capital and had him deposed.
Though Selim’s reformers were almost entirely annihilated, the vast superiority of the Nizami Cedid troop provided models for his contemporaries to witness, among whom Mehmet Ali of Egypt and Mahmud II . His introduction of modern schools provided the first windows of positive European influence on the Ottoman mind, and a small Westernizing cadre to assist his successor in a bolder attempt to wrest power from conservative forces.
Sultan Mahmud II was put on the throne by Bayraktar, a Balkan notable who both abhorred Janissary anarchy and control of the central government . The notables sought to maintain the “state”, with the sultan rendered ineffectual. This was the purpose of the 1808 “Decree of Alliance” (Senedi Ittifak), so called “the Ottoman Magna Carta”, which would lead to a decentralized, askeri-based constitutional monarchy . However, the Janissaries, seeing their parasitic host, the central government being upset, rose and destroyed Bayraktar, but preserved Mahmud because he was the only legitimate Ottoman heir.
During his early reign, Mahmud worked diligently to bring the provinces back to center control while appointing confidants to the bureaucratic, religious and military institutions . When the preparation was ready, Mahmud reserved the final blow for the Janissaries. This was the famous “Auspicious Incident” (Vakai Hayriye) of 1826. After the destruction of the Janissaries, he devoted his major efforts on the construction of a new army, called the “Victorious Muhammadan Army”.
The army, under a Commander-cum-Minister of War, was more easily controlled by the central government Due to Egypt, Britain and France’s attempts to frustrate the sultans military modernization, Prussian instructors were invited, thus initiating the German influence of Ottoman diplomacy. In order to create an effective cadre, Mahmud decreed the establishment of modern military medical schools with secular primary and secondary preparatory sections, to be followed by a secondary school system for civilian purposes. The post of “dragoman” for the Porte, long monopolized by Greek Phanariots was first staffed by Muslim Turks, providing the Muslim ruling class with direct knowledge of European diplomacy . Many scientific terms were first introduced into the Turkish language thanks to efforts to translate textbooks for the new military schools. Permanent embassies in European capitals were reopened . The sultan also took bold steps by sending Ottoman students to European capitals. Mahmud abolished the age old practice of summary confiscation of properties of deceased or condemned officials, ending the chaotic state in the officialdom in which insecure officials were forced to abuse state power to their advantage. He then put the officials on regular salaries and tried to replace the old scribal guild system with modern training schools . He then parceled out the duties of the undifferentiated system of the Sublime Porte into ministries with modern nomenclatures, and also appointed advisory councils to monitor the ministries.
The changes in the Porte during Mahmud’s lifetime was rather superficial, but subsequent generations would see an enlarged bureaucracy increasingly staffed by civil servants with Western outlook and professional skills.
The new tax system introduced for the new army was to develop into the Ministry of Finance. However, Mahmud’s inability to enforce state monopoly on vital products forced him to continue the practice of debasing the currency in order to finance the deficit. It was the grave financial hardship, not Mahmud’s iron fists that force the last vestiges of the Ottoman “timar”(fief) system to give way to the widespread tax-farming system. The liquidation of the feudal system gave Mahmud more central control, while sent the state further down a path towards financial dependency on the West.
The Ulema and various Sufi tariqas, in the times of rigid asker-reaya divide, served as a web of common values and obligations. They sided with conservative and reactionary forces in times of change, and harbored profound xenophobia toward things Western. It was only possible for Mahmud to subdue them after the destruction of provincial ayan and the Janissaries, traditional repositories of conservative forces like the Ulema. The sultan put the “evkaf”(estates for pious foundations) under a state ministry and put appointed muftis and kadis on state payroll, thus effectively subduing this challenge to absolute state authority. Mahmud also established the first Ottoman official gazette and a state postal system, both headed by European advisers.
Mahmud was a far more resolute and ruthless young ruler than his deposed cousin Selim. The Ottoman Empire after his death in 1839 was a vastly different regime than the one he inherited from ineffectual monarchs. A visionary in his own right, Mahmud almost single-handedly took on the notables and the Janissaries, thus earning himself a far more central place than Selim or Bayraktar ever would. However, his efforts were marred by a desperate want of able bodies with sufficient expertise to carry out further reforms. It was from his modern schools, European embassies and European-instructed corps that reformers with true appreciation of Western ideology and sophisticated understanding of the problems of modernization would graduate. But this was not until the latter years of the Tanzimat period. He still had to employ the same “divide and rule” strategy to balance rival forces within the reformer’s camp, jeopardizing much honesty and solidarity. He was not able to replace all existing institutions with modern ones, thus creating the redundant coexistence of modernity along with tradition, reflecting the incurable divide between the common people and the elite. Mahmud was never able to master the spiraling economic decline. He was unwittingly undoing his regime by building costly modern institutions on the sand of medieval agrarian economy.
The Ottoman reforms from 1793 to 1839 left a superficially but ostensibly Westernizing elite political culture in the place of the “askeriye” of old. While the rigid social boundaries were lifted and civil servants, soldiers recruited from the lower classes, the new Westernizing elite remained as detached from the common people as ever. The new elite sought political legitimacy from a Westernized elite value system largely alien to the commoners. Thus, the Westernized political culture of the 19th century can be considered a dynamic continuation of the static “askeri” elite culture called “adab”.
The 19th century Ottoman elites were not fundamentally modernized because they continued the notion that involvement in the central state, newly augmented by Mahmud, was the single path of ascendancy, while the spirit of the time actually favored lesser-faire capitalism. This elite, frustrated in commercial activities due to the European-manipulated Capitulation system, devoted their efforts to ideological mobilization.
Mahmud’s descendants would see the culmination of his absolutist, despotic ideal in Abdulmecid’s pan-Islamic despotism, while this development was certainly antithetical to the favorite of 19th century---secular nationalism, which found its patrons among the sophisticated and confident bureaucrats--- the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks.
While little was channeled down in the way of developing a truly Ottoman bourgeoisie, many within the empire who already had a preliminary success with capitalism: the Christian, especially Greek bourgeoisie and Muhammad Ali, chose to spin off to their own directions by breaking away from the Ottoman Empire once and for all.
In conclusion, the 1793-1839 reforms of Selim and Mahmud constituted a great leap forward that helped the Ottoman Empire inside the threshold of the 19th century, only returning it to the mincing steps of old, neglecting the fundamental modernization that was economic, until its being diagnosed of terminal illness in the form of bankruptcy, foreshadowing another violent change.
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