The Rogers Commission Report was created by a Presidential Commission charged to investigate the Space Shuttle Challenger explosion on its 10th mission, STS-51-L. The comprehensive 225-page report documented the technical and managerial factors that contributed to the accident. The board's technical analysis implicated the SRB O-Rings which failed as a result of inadequate inspection and low temperatures. Other key findings of the Rogers Commission were that the Shuttle had not been rated to fly in the temperatures of the launch but that that technical concern had been overriden by NASA management after a series of launch delays. The SRB O-rings had been found to be unexpectedly eroded in previous inspections, but that that finding had been largely ignored or minimized.

The investigation and corrective actions following the Challenger accident caused an 18-month hiatus in shuttle launches: the next mission was STS-26 on September 29, 1988 with Discovery. Reforms to NASA procedures were enacted which attempted to preclude another occurrence of such an accident, and the Shuttle program would continue without serious incident until the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster on February 1, 2003.

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