Islam is the second religion in France, with approximately 4,200,000 adherents, after 45,000,000 adherents to Catholicism, and before Protestantism (1,000,000), Buddhism (600,000), Judaism (525,000) and Orthodoxism (150,000) (data: 2000-2003).

In 2003, between 4 and 5 million people of Muslim extraction live in France: over 35% come from Algeria, 25% from Morocco, 10% from Tunisia. Some estimate the number of French converts to be around 30,000.

Table of contents
1 Muslim population in France
2 Integration issues
3 Islamism in France
4 External links

Muslim population in France

There have been Muslims in France since the colonisation of Algeria in the 1830s. It is estimated they were tens of thousands as early as the 1920s. Muslim immigration, primarily from Algeria and other North African colonies, was very high following World War II, because the French workforce was inadequate for reconstruction efforts.

The Muslim population is now estimated at 4 to 5 million (compared to a total French population of about 60 millions people). This is only an estimate, since census of religion adherence is prohibited by French law. Most social scientists believe this number is too low, and speak of as many as 8 million Muslims in France (compared to 12 to 20 million in the European Union).

The terms "Arab" and "Muslim" are often confused; in practice, Arabs can be Muslim, Christian, agnostic, etc.;, while Muslims can be non-Arab; a number of French people have converted to Islam. However in the popular perception "Arab" and "Muslim" are often seen as synonomous.

The number of French non-Arabs who have converted to Islam is unknown; some surveys suggest up to 30,000 conversions have occured in the last few decades; some in the Muslim community claim a number ten times as high.

For many French people, the term Muslims is unprecise, as they sometimes use it to refer to an ancestry, and sometimes as a varying set of religious practices. However, if religious adherence and ethnic origin may be juxtaposed and even reinforced by each other, they are not synonymous. The French State does not recognise ethnic background, but does recognise religious adherence and tries to organize a representation of the French Muslims.

The first generation of Muslims, today retired, was not seen as immigrants, neither by the State and the employers, nor by Muslims themselves. Muslims kept strong ties with their countries, where their family often lived. Then, in 1974, the government favored regrouping families, and children and wives came over. Most Muslims asked for the French nationality at this time.

The situation was different with the second generation, in majority born in France, and as such French citizens. They do not intend to go to their country of origin, with which they have few bounds. They often feel like immigrants, though with little knowledge of the country of their ancestors.

Olivier Roy indicates that the fact they are Muslims is only one element among others. The identification with the area of origin is much stronger: they are first Algerians, Moroccans, Kabyles, Turks. In general, the weight of the identity of origin is stronger for the first generation, which is why religious buildings built by this generation are Turkish, Tunisian, Moroccan, etc.

This is not so true with the second generation, who often do not even speak Arabic. The second generation of Muslims have many generational conflicts with newer imams (Muslim religious leaders). Most immigrant Imams have an education based solely in Islamic fundamentalism, learned outside France. Their beliefs non-Muslims and rejection of French secular enlightenment values are at odds with some of the modern modernized French Muslim youth, but are very appealing to other French Muslim youth.

The French Muslim population has a higher birth rate than non-Muslims, though the numbers are dropping. The offspring of immigrants from north african countries (mostly 2nd generation) are referred to (and refer to themselves) as beurs or beurettes. The term comes from verlan, with "beur" = "arabe" (via a-ra-b-e -> be-ra- -> beur).

Muslim religious practices

Those who want to behave as active Muslims must define themselves, in terms of their relationship with the country of origin, their positioning with the host country and the definition of a religious identity which is not the simple transfer of the religious identity of their country of origin.

In France, two tendencies co-exist (see also Five Pillars of Islam):

  • Some assume their religion within the French model: they practice prayer (salat), observe the fast of Ramadan, don't eat pork and don't drink wine. This tendency is the one followed by the majority of French Muslims: about three quarters of French Muslims fast during Ramadan, about two-thirds avoid alcohol, and most do not eat pork.
  • Others request the recognition of an Islamic community in France (which community remains to be built) with an official status.

Two large organisations, the Federation of the French Muslims (Fédération des musulmans de France) with a majority of Moroccan leadership, and the Union of the Islamist organisations in France (Union des organisations islamistes en France), influenced by the Muslim Brothers.

1,535 mosques are numbered in France, though only a dozen have been built for that use. About 30 are currently being built. There is a Muslim school in La Réunion, and the first w:fr:collège (welcoming students from 11 to 15) opened its doors in 2001 in Aubervilliers with 11 students. 2 other schools are under project (2003).

Integration issues

Reaction to the rise of Islam as a social and political force among Muslim immigrant groups

The French first saw Islam as an invasion from former colonies.

Today, mass media play an important role in the perception that non-Muslim French have of French-Muslims. French media points to the high rates of crime and poverty among certain immigrant communities, and to the influence individual Muslims have had on national athletics, the arts, and popular culture. In France, Islam is especially present in popular suburbs. The Muslim population is very concentrated, mostly in parts of Paris, Marseille, Lyon, and Strasbourg. In Paris suburbs, Seine St-Denis host numerous Muslim people (one-third of the total population), and is undergoing high rates of unemployment (30% in La Courneuve). It is one of the most violent département of France, with a high murder rate, antisemitic violence, vandalism, and drug dealing.

Some parties, such as Jean-Marie Le Pen's Front National and Bruno Mégret's Mouvement National Républicain, claim that the large numbers of immigrants of such a foreign culture destabilize France and see a clear danger in Islamist behaviors among the immigrant Muslim population.

A few issues are cristalizing the debate, the islamic veil being the most representative of all.

The hijab issue

See also : French headscarf law

The wearing of the hijab in France has been a very controversial issue since 1989. The debate essentially concerns whether Muslim girls may wear a hidjab in public schools.

Traditionalist Muslims believe that the Quran instructs women to keep their heads covered (outside of the immediate family); they argue that it is a form of religious discrimination, not to allow head coverings in school. They believe that this is an attempt to impose secular values on them.

The French government position, and most public opinion, is to oppose to the wearing of an "ostentatious" sign of religious expression (dress or symbol), whatever the religion, as this is incompatible with the French system of laïcité. Mr Chirac said in december 2003 that it breaches the separation of church and state and would increase tensions in France's multicultural society, whose Muslim and Jewish populations are both the biggest of their kind in west Europe.

Most teachers are highly opposed to the veil, often perceived as one alienating the women. They feel it is their responsability to insure that girls are not allowed to wear the veil, thus protecting those not wearing it, as well as preventing the others of wearing it any more.

The issue of Muslim hidjabs has sparked controversy after several girls refuse to uncovering their heads in class, as early as 1989. In October 1989, three Muslim schoolgirls wearing the Islamic headscarf were expelled from the collège (secondary school) Gabriel-Havez in Creil (north of Paris). In November, the First Conseil d'Etat ruling affirmed that the wearing of the Islamic headscarf, as a symbol of religious expression, in public schools was not incompatible with the French school system and the system of laïcité. In December, a first ministerial circular (circulaire Jospin) was published, stating teachers had to decide on a case-by-case basis whether to ban the wearing of the Islamic headscarf.

In January 1990, three schoolgirls were expelled from the collège Pasteur in Noyon, north of Paris. The parents of one expelled schoolgirl filed a defamation action against the school principal of the collège Gabriel-Havez in Creil. As a result, the teachers of a collège in Nantua (eastern part of France, just to the west of Geneva, Switzerland) went on strike to protest against the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in school. A second ministerial circular was published in October, to restate the need to respect the principle of laïcité in public schools.

In September 1994, a third ministerial circular (circulaire Bayrou) was published, making a distinction between "discrete" symbols to be tolerated in public schools, and "ostentatious" symbols, including the Islamic headscarf, to be banned from public schools. In October, some students demonstrated at the lycée St. Exupery in Mantes-la-Jolie (northwest of Paris) to support the freedom to wear Islamic headscarves in school. In November, approximately 24 veiled schoolgirls were expelled from the lycée (secondary school) St. Exupery in Mantes-la-Jolie and the lycée Faidherbe in the city of Lille.

Since 1994, around 100 girls have been excluded from French state schools for wearing such veils since 1994. In half the cases courts subsequently overturned the decision.

"Headscarf law"

In December 2003 President Chirac decided that the law should prohibit the wearing of visible religious signs in schools, according to laïcité requirements that a text should be adopted according to the emergency procedure, in January or February, in order to be applied in September 2004. This law (sometimes called the French headscarf law) would forbid wearing "ostensibles" (which means both visibles, and meant to be visibles) signs of belonging to one religion. Items prohibited by this law would include Muslim headscarves, Jewish yarmulkes or large Christian crosses. It will still be permissible to wear discreet symbols of faith such as small crosses, Stars of David or Fatima's hands.

A large majority of French people, and in particular teachers, are in favor of this ban. Some religious leaders have showed their opposition.

References

See also

Political Islam

Political Islam is quite important in France, and helps to provide social protection, assistance in the immigration process, and cultural integration. Formal as well as informal Muslim organisations help the new French citizens in their process of integration with the culture, who often feel their countries of origin can no longer represent them.

Government efforts toward integration

The government is actively working to formulate an official policy on Islam.

As indicated above, it is difficult to determine in France who may be called a Muslim. Another word often used is arabe, but some mention that not all immigrants from Algeria for example, are Arabs; furthermore, not all Arabs are Muslim. Feelings may be very complex and contradictory, as a person may feel hostility toward a religion, but not toward a person of North African origin. When one talks about Islam, does he intend to refer to Muslims or to Arabs? Is Islam a religion, or is it a more general reference to the background of some people? Similarly, is a "beur" an Arab, a Muslim, an Algerian or an immigrant?

Islamism in France

Islamism (Islamisme in French) is a term that is rather less used than others, perhaps due to its lack of precision. The following terms are often used : Islamiste (when referring to a person), islamique (for a qualifier, the "hidjab" or foulard islamique, or barbe islamique, the beard), mouvement islamique (to refer to a political movement), mouvement intégriste or mouvement extrémiste (to refer to a fundamentalist group), mouvement terroriste (for a group using violence to achieve its ends).

In Muslim states, Islamist movements are essentially political. Olivier Roy calls Islamists those which see in Islam a political ideology, in the modern sense of the term, "ideology". In other words a theory which presumes to entirely understand the social side of a society, in political terms.

Islamists want to influence the laws of States. When using the term Islamiste, Muslims refer almost exclusively to their own specific program to establish an Islamic state. There are many more movements to establish such states than are recognized as Islamist by the West, thus the use is not very uniform.

This is not to say that Islamist groups overtly advocate violent takeover in every political environ, so that they should be seen necessarily as terrorists. Because influence in French politics is possible without resorting to violence, the use of violence in that context is considered counterproductive toward achieving their goal of guiding the political system according to the principles of Islam. However, in Algeria, the situation is different. Events there ultimately affect the posture of Islamists toward France itself, as the hope of bringing about an Islamic state in Algeria is a cause for which some French Islamists are willing to turn to violence.

What is actually meant by Muslims who refer to themselves as Islamist is the formal establishment of the Sharia, but often with modern adaptations at variance from a strictly traditional interpretation. Fundamentalism and traditionalism, of themselves, do not have this specific political connotation at all. Islamists are deemed such according to their adherence to the political goal of an Islamic state, rather than by features of their religious observance. Therefore, Islamists may be Fundamentalists, or not.

Islamists characterize their movement as:

  • a recall to tradition, which in Arabic is called "Sallaf". This is a doctrine from the end of the XIXth century, "la Salafia". It may be found in many Islamist mouvements, and in particular in Algeria, in one of the GIA groups (There are several different doctrines in Islamism, and given the variety of the movements, and their varying goals, it is almost always advisable when referring to a specific political movement, to avoid generalizations and refer to it by its name.)

  • The return to following the laws outlined in the Qur'an ("Coran" in French). Islamists support a revolutionary and political reading of the Qur'an, they criticize the ante-Islamic times ("jamiliyya"), when the world was populated only with pagans and mecreants.

  • and especially, Islam as religion and State. This dogma has been adopted, for example, by the djazarist faction of the G.I.A. This is meant to say that the State should ultimately be a Muslim State.

Islamists often portray themselves as a revival movement, a call to Muslims to renew their own adherence to fundamental Islamic religious principles and laws, which initially apply only to Muslims.

History of Islamism

Before 1995 (the year several terrorist attacks occurred in France), Islamist terrorism raised in many French people mind the memory of arab action in the 1960s. However, the real violent actions appeared in the 1970s.

At the beginning of the Seventies, Arab socialism is in crisis, because of bankruptcy, economical failure and cultural dependence from the West.

Once the common opposition to colonialism, corruption and racism was established as a focus, debates on political Islam became generally focused on three core questions through the 1970s:

  • status of women and integration of priorities of feminism into a renewed fiqh
  • Islamic economics and the role of debt in oppression and stagnation of Muslim states
  • Zionism and the capacity of Muslims for self-governance, control of oil revenues, etc.

United Nations cooperation was pivotal in this view - as was cooperation with secular forces and allies. The agenda of secular and Islamist movements during this period was all but indistinguishable. In 1979 the political situation drastically changed, with Egypt making peace with Israel, the Iranian Revolution, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan - all three events had wide-ranging effects on how Islam was perceived as a political phenomenon.

Some Muslims place the blame for all flaws in Muslim societies on the influx of "foreign" ideas including debt-based capitalism, communism, and even feminism; a return to the principles of Islam is seen as the natural cure. This is however interpreted in very many ways: socialism and Marxism as a guide to adapting Islam to the modern world was in decline by the 1980s as the USSR invaded Afghanistan and polarized attitudes against Communism and other secular variants of socialism. Capitalism was often discredited by plain corruption.

One persistent theme that both proponents and opponents of Islam as a political movement note is that Muslims are actively persecuted by the West and other foreigners. This view is of course not distinguishable from a critique of imperialism including oil imperialism, since many Muslim nations are sitting on relatively vast oil reserves. Colonialism is often identified as the force which is 'against Islam', and seems to neatly encompass British Empire experiences as well as those of modern times - the long Ottoman domination being more or less forgotten.

It was largely through reactive measures that the movement that is labelled Islamist came to be visible to the West, where it was labelled as being a distinct movement from Islam, pan-Arabism and resistance to colonization.

The legitimacy of this kind of distinction is very much in doubt. The French Olivier Roy, a top advisor to French President Jacques Chirac, holds that the primary motive of all of this activity is resistance to colonialism and control of the Islamic World by outsiders. In this view, the movement called Islamist is wholly reactive and incidental, just a convenient rationale used to justify what is in fact resistance of a cultural and economic sort.

However, there are many overt similarities. Those militants who follow a version of shariah based on the classical fiqh ("jurisprudence") as interpreted by local ulema ("jurists"), were the most prominent of several competing trends in modern Islamic philosophy in the 1970s and 1980s.

Attacks in the 1985-1986

13 deads and 250 wounded

Airbus in 1994

The GIA hijacked an Air France flight to Algiers in December 1994.

Terrorist attacks in 1995

France had to undergo a series of Islamist terrorist attacks in 1995, more especially related to Algeria. The first violent islamist mouvements appeared in Algeria in the 1980/1984 by the emergence of a new mouvement, the M.I.A. (Algerian Islamic movement), lead by Mustapha Bouyali. It was dismantled in years 1988/1989. After the dissolution, about 150 people were judged (members of this mouvement, Ali Beladj and Abdelbaki Sahraoui, were assassinated in 1995 in Paris). In October 1988, a large meeting mostly made of students in Algiers lead to between 500 and 600 dead. These events were used by some Islamists who created new parties, such as the F.I.S. in Algeria (1989/1990) then the G.I.A. (leader Mansour Emezziani), reconstructed from the M.I.A. The first violent action of the G.I.A. occurred in 1992 before elections in Algeria. This date is the beginning of many violent actions, which will have repercussions in France, because of the very tight ties between France and Algeria.

See also: Islamism, Islam

w:fr:Termes arabes utilisés en Islam

External links

France trapped by its Islamists